Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
LOGISTICS OPERATIONS IN COMBAT OPERATIONS AGAINST AN INSURGENT FORCE Problem
Conducting logistics operations in dispersed combat operations against a predominately insurgent force is an issue that military leaders struggle with today. Supplying joint and coalition forces requires leaders to deploy hundreds of combat logistics patrols each day. The road networks in an insurgent war are not secure and put soldiers at risk. This paper explores how to distribute supplies and reduce the risk or avoid the enemy's threat to our combat logistics patrols in an insurgent environment.
Strategic and future combat system development and acquisition planners consider many ways to reduce the threat to our soldiers in the direct fire fight, However, not much emphasize is put into the methods that reduce the threat to our joint and coalition combat service support operations. Therefore, I will examine the current threat to logistics operations, explore opportunities for improved, and what we should have done in the past to reduce the threat to our soldiers in an non-secure insurgent environment, and recommend methods to develop a strategy for the development of proto-type equipment and re-supply operations that will reduce or eliminate the threat to our soldiers conducting re-supply missions. Re-supply by air is the best method to move supplies without putting soldiers at risk. Therefore, I will present a recommendation that will offer the military other options to conduct re-supply operations that reduces the threat to our soldiers on the insurgent battlefield. This recommendation will focus on the capabilities to conduct air re-supply.
Secure Lines of Communication (LOC) for Re-supply
The insurgent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have enemies that are not thinking in terms of linear battle fields of World War II (WWII) and Korea. The enemy is everywhere and we do not have a vote of where and when the enemy will attack the US soldiers and our assets. The
United States forces lines of communication (LOC) in Iraq and Afghanistan are in danger of
having their line of supply cut by guerrillas. Napoleon once said that an army travels on its stomach. He meant that the problem of keeping an army supplied is the prerequisite for the very existence of the force. A 21st-century military force consumes a tremendous volume of expendable supplies and continuously needs repairs to equipment as well as medical treatment. 1 Today in the Central Command's area of operations, they deliver over 1000 resupply trucks to the combat forces daily. The cost is a staggering 6.4 Billion per month. 2 Without a plentiful and dependable source of fuel, food, and ammunition, a military force falters.
First it stops moving, then it begins to starve, and eventually it becomes unable to resist the enemy. 3 In 1915, this happened to British forces that had invaded Mesopotamia. A British-Indian force traveled up the line of the Tigris River, advancing to Kut, southeast of Baghdad. They became besieged there after their line of supply was cut along the river to the south. Some 11,000 troops ultimately surrendered, after the allies suffered another 23,000 casualties trying to rescue them. 4 Today in Iraq and Afghanistan, potential adversaries along the LOCs and the cities include many combat experienced members and well schooled officers and former officers. We can be sure that they are acutely aware of this weakness in our situation. The precarious nature of our supply LOCs lack of security is well-known to our military leadership.
Unfortunately, this is one of the many problems in Iraq and Afghanistan that has not been adequately addressed because of a shortage of troops. We should start building ourselves another line of supply as a backup, and we should do it soon. 5 We must determine alternate ways to move the supplies required by the military around the battlefield with a greatly reduced or virtually no threat to our soldiers. Understanding the threat in an insurgent environment is the first step.
LOC Threat (Improvised Explosive Devices)
The threat is evolving in the insurgent environments. The most predominant threat to distribution of supplies and our soldiers are the improvised explosive devices (IED). IEDs are not the new threat that many perceive them to be and actually have been used all over the world for decades. One of the first coordinated, large-scale uses of the devices was during World War II, when Belarusian guerillas used them against the Nazis to derail thousands of Nazi trains. 6 Beg`inning in July 2003, the Iraqi insurgency used IEDs (more often referred to as roadside bombs by the press) to target American and Coalition vehicles. sway to those forces that excel in intelligence, communications, and command and control abilities. 15 Even though we had advance warning from several force development agencies and research organizations, the force equipment providers ignored lessons learned from the past (like the 48 th Transportation Group in Vietnam) and advanced research agencies that projected the likelihood of a non-secure rear areas and non-secure lines of communications will most certainly be present. However, we entered OIF in 2003, with equipment that did not protect our soldiers from small arms and anti-armor threat. We were unprepared and we were without excuse.
CBS Sixty Minutes reported in October 2004, "two weeks ago, a group of Army reservists in Iraq refused a direct order to go on a dangerous operation to re-supply another unit with jet fuel. Without helicopter gun ships to escort them over a treacherous stretch of highway, and lacking armored vehicles, soldiers from the 343rd Quartermaster Company called it a suicide mission. The Army called it an isolated incident; a temporary breakdown in discipline, and an investigation was initiated. But the 343rd was not the first outfit to be put in harm's way without proper equipment, and commanders in Iraq acknowledged that the unit's concerns were legitimate, even if their mutiny was not". 16 However, the U.S. did accelerate the purchase up- This self-contained method of delivery was employed while the air strip was repaired in late 1967. The name of the system accurately described the technique. As the aircraft came in low over the airstrip, the pilot opened the tail gate and released a reefed cargo parachute which was connected to the pallet mounted cargo in the aircraft. When the load master electrically cut the reefing line, it caused the parachute to fully deploy and inflate. The parachute then jerked the pallets out of the aircraft over the roller system mounted on the aircraft floor. After a five to ten foot drop, the cargo skidded to a halt on the runway. Experienced pilots could consistently leave their loads in a 25-meter square.
20
A second technique was also used to deliver cargo by aircraft without actually landing.
This method was known as the Ground Proximity Extraction System (GPES). GPES was
employed less frequently than the low altitude system. In the GPES delivery, the C-130 aircraft came in low over the airstrip, the pilot would attempted to snag an arresting line on the ground similar to the line a navy pilot uses in landing on an aircraft carrier. The ground line then jerked the cargo from the opened rear of the aircraft. 21 Both methods were available options to reduce exposure to the threat on un-secure LOCs. Clearly it is imperative for the military force to have air superiority and the enemy air defense capability must be eliminated prior to this method of re-supply. Additionally, this resupply method requires an air strip and generally a secure location. In the end, re-supply with cargo deliveries or air drops with LAPES or GPES type distribution systems, will reduce the threat to re-supply operations under attack by IED and direct fire capabilities.
Another example of a successful re-supply operation that was accomplished entirely by air helicopter. Under those circumstances, units would load up quickly, bury or burn those items that could not be carried (i.e. bulky packages from home), and move from the site to a more secure location. 25 Clearly these troops from the 6 th Infantry relied solely on the aerial re-supply operations. Unfortunately, air re-supply is never the first option in logistics planning, even in today's combat operations. Our first option is to use the CLPs due to the volume of supplies required by our troops and spare parts to maintain our equipment and because of our culture.
However, the option to re-supply our troops by air (fixed wing, helicopter, or air drops) reduces the risk to soldiers and logistics distribution on the insurgent battlefield.
An important implication of this option would require a substantial increase in air lift assets. However, other options could prove to be a very effective method of distributing supplies on the battle field in greater volums than it is today. Global positioning system guide pallets are now being tested in combat to distribute supplies to remote areas that are hard to acess in Iraq and Afgainstan.
The Marines have always been the lead in air delivery capability. Just as they did in While in flight, the Sherpa constantly checks its position using a GPS receiver, and makes flight adjustments as necessary, pulling on two steering lines to turn the parachute. Before the mission, the aircraft's altitude and speed, the cargo's weight, the drop zone location and wind speeds for various heights must be programmed into the Sherpa's control unit so it can calculate a flight plan, said Gunnery Sgt. Lorrin K. Bush, head of the air delivery platoon. It can even be programmed to maneuver around obstacles or locations where enemy forces are located. In response, the Sherpa calculates the precise point in the sky where the cargo must be dropped. As a result, the riggers are taking on more responsibility since they can now plan part of the flight's path. 26 While air delivery has seen limited use by the Marines thus far in Iraq, its helps reduce the number of Marines and vehicles taking to the dangerous Iraqi highways, veins of insurgent activity but lifelines to sustain troops. Air re-supply reduce vehicle convoys to remote bases like Korean Village in Iraq and the Marines plan on equipping the second rotation of air delivery
Marines with larger parachutes and pallets capable of delivering much larger loads of rations and water. Sherpas will be incorporated into standard drops as well as used to re-supply units operating remotely. 27 The GPS guided air drops are certainly proof that this system will provide a proven alternative.
The fact of the matter is, after multiple historical examples of excellent methods to resupply the military by air, which is much safer than re-supply operations by ground, the culture Airlifting supplies with Air Force fixed wing assets and aerial delivery systems, military helicopters, or guided and precise air drops are methods to minimize the threat to soldiers.
Unfortunately these are not the first methods that the ground force commanders use to distribute supplies. Clearly the air delivery systems remove the CLP as a target option.
However, most ground force commanders do not trust the air capability to get enough and of the required supplies to the place and time it is required. The ground forces generally do not trust the Army or Air force air re-supply to get what they need to conduct combat operations. The joint force must develop a strategy to trust the air capability and then develop more rotary and fixed wing intra-theater capability to deliver supplies by air which takes the insurgent enemies option to attack our CLPs away.
Conclusion
The distribution of supplies in the Conducting logistics operations in dispersed combat operations against a predominately insurgent force is an issue that military leaders struggle with today. Supplying the joint and coalition forces requires leaders to deploy thousands of combat logistics patrols each day. The road networks in insurgent wars are generally not secure and put soldiers at risk. Each day we see the number of troops that are killed in Iraq and Afghanistan on CNN. To date there are over 3100 troops killed in Iraq alone.
To reduce the threat and number of US troops killed we could clearly use the technology that is readily available to reduce the number of CLPs that the military deploys daily to supply the forces. The threat can be reduced if we provide the added protection that add-on-armor gives our troops. This clearly reduces the direct fire threat to our troops. Even better options are to re-supply by air which eliminates the threat to our troops conducting CLPs to distribute supplies. It is noted that the air superiority must be maintained or the threat will simply move from troops on the ground to the troops operating the rotary and fixed wing air frames.
History shows us there is capability available to distribute supplies that will reduce the threat to our troops in an insurgent environment. Insurgent environments with non-secure LOCs are going to continue in today's wars and wars in the future. We have many means available today that can support our troops and reduce threats that kill troops on the ground. The acquisition increased air frames and air delivery capability deserves immediate attention. The means to move to safer and reduced threats are available today. The military must look hard at the new threats in the insurgent environment and then move into a direction that will move from 10 percent of re-supply operations by air and distribute the predominant amount of supplies by air delivery capabilities.
The military and Department of Defense should consider this joint problem and implement an acquisition strategy that develops a rotary and fixed wing capability that can support intratheater air re-supply and reduce the total number of CLPs. Clearly this requires a culture change in all services. More importantly it requires the services to thrust each other and to demonstrate that missions are conducted on time to support combat operations in the theaters of operations. This change in operations and culture requires a joint approach to persuade congress that the new acquisition cost would make the battlefield safer and would reduce the threat and risk to our troops.
